We consider a pair of networks A and B which are subject to failures of their components. In A, edges are subject to failure, and A fails when it disintegrates into several isolated clusters each containing a single terminal. Edges of A fail in random order and their failure moments follow Poisson process. After A has failed, terminal  of A causes a failure ("attacks") on R  randomly chosen non terminal nodes of network B. All edges incident to an attacked node are erased. The "attacks" take negligible time. Network B failure takes place if it loses its terminal connectivity. We study the probability that B will be in failure state at moment t as a function of t and .
Introduction
Networks attract overgrowing interest in modern research literature. Since network type systems presently appear in every sphere of our life (social networks, communication networks, Internet, etc.) their reliability, survivability and resilience studies are becoming a hot and important issue. Particular interest is attracted by the so-called cascading failure phenomena in networks, i.e. massive network failures triggered by failure of a small part of the network components; see e.g. [7] and many references presented there on this issue.
Majority of the works on network reliability deals with probabilistic failure description and modelling in a single network. At the same time most modern networks do not exist and function in an isolated mode. As noted in [2] , "due to technological progress, modern systems are becoming more and more coupled together. While in the past many networks would provide their functionality independently, modern systems depend on one another to provide proper functionality". For example, the financial network of banks and related financial institutions is interconnected with the business network of industrial enterprises. A "failure" (e.g. bankruptcy) of a particular bank in one country may cause serious problems of financing and/or industrial activity of several enterprises operating in another part of the world.
One of the few works devoted to the failures in interdependent networks is an important paper [2] , which discusses as an example a communication network and the power supply network. In this case, the nodes of the communication network, which control the operation of power supply stations, depend on the power supplied by the power station, while the power station operation depends on information and control supplied by the communication network.
In the work [2] is considered cascade-type phenomena in a pair of networks having different topology and equal number of nodes, which interact with each other on the basis of one-to-one correspondence between the nodes of both networks: if a node  of network A becomes dysfunctional, then the same happens with its image node of ( )
Initially, a (1 -p) fraction of nodes in A become nonfunctional. This means that all edges in A incident to these nodes are erased. Simultaneously, the "images" of failed A-nodes, also become nonfunctional and the B-edges incident to them are also erased. As a result, both networks disintegrate into a number of isolated clusters. The problem investigated in [2] is the following: "what is the critical c p p  below which all the mutual clusters constitute only an infinitesimal fraction of the network, i.e. no mutual giant component exist".
In this paper we study a pair of small networks A and B with different topologies. Several nodes in A (called terminals) "mark" (or "attack") in a random and independent way a certain number of non terminal nodes in B. Similarly to [2] , all edges incident to a marked (attacked) node B   are erased.
Typically, we will consider edge failures in network A, as a result of which it disintegrates into a number of isolated clusters. (A cluster is a connected isolated sub network containing at least one terminal).
The first phase of the process of failure development in our model is disintegration of A into isolated clusters resulting from a random process of its edge failures that is governed by a Poisson process. After this phase ends, all terminal nodes of A "mark" ("attack") in a random way some number of non terminal nodes in B. It means the beginning of the second phase of network failure. All edges incident to marked (attacked) nodes of B are erased, as a result of which B may be in failure state, according to its operational criterion. For example, B may lose its s -t connectivity. We assume that the second stage lasts negligible amount of time. The problem which we investigate is the following.
Assume that at t = 0 network A starts to disintegrate. Then we are interested in finding the probability ( ; ) B P DOWN t that network B will be in failure state at moment t.
The further exposition is as follows. In section 2 we consider the formal model of networks A and B and the failure development mechanism. Section 3 is devoted to the derivation of the expression for ( ; ) . We investigate numerically how ( ; ) B P DOWN t depends on t and the total number of "attacks".
Model Description
Network A. Network A is a triple ( , , ), 
 In other words, random intervals between edge failures have exponential distribution with density ( ) exp( ). f t t    
The probability that exactly x failures take place in the interval [0, t] equals therefore
In the course of edge failures, A disintegrates into separate components, where each component is a connected sub network isolated from other sub networks. An isolated connected sub network, which contains a terminal, is called cluster. T r  The components subject to failure in this network are the nonterminal nodes. Node  failure means that all edges incident to it are erased, and therefore  becomes isolated. The B DOWN state is defined in terms of terminal connectivity, e.g. as loss of s − t connectivity, or isolation of one of the terminals from other terminals, see e.g. [3, 4, 5] . Another option is defining the B DOWN state as network disintegration into connected isolated subnetworks the largest of which does not have more than max L nodes [6] . Let us denote by 0 ( ; ) k p R n the probability that exactly k boxes will be red. The following de Moivre's formula (see [1] , p. 242) gives this probability:
Action of A on B. Each terminal
Let us assume that the action of A on B is implemented in the following way. After network A gets DOWN, its terminals randomly "throw balls" on the non terminal nodes of B in the above described manner. This "bombardment" lasts negligible time.
The nodes of B receiving a ball (marked "red") are declared as failed, and all edges incident to these nodes are erased. As the result, B may get DOWN. Our ultimate goal is to find the probability ( ; )
B P DOWN t that B is DOWN at moment t.
Remark: cascading failures. According to WIKIPEDIA, "cascading failure is a failure in a system of interconnected parts in which the failure of a part can trigger the failure of successive parts". In our system of two networks, the cascading effect will exist if complete isolation of few terminals in A causes network B to enter B DOWN state.
Probabilistic Analysis
The central role in our analysis is played by the so-called network D-spectra [3, 4] . Let us shortly remind this notion. Suppose that we number the network components subject to failure as 1, 2, ..., n. Consider a random permutation 1 2 { , ,..., } n i i i   of these numbers. Assign to each permutation probability 1/n!. Imagine that all components are functional ("up" ) and we start turning them down moving along the permutation from left to right. After each step of this process we check the state of the network and note the number of the components needed to be turned down to reveal for the first time that the network has failed. Let (the network failed on step ) , 1, 2,..., .
Obviously, { } j f is a proper discrete density:
In literature it is known also under the name signature [8] . We will use the cumulative signature (cumulative spectrum) F(x) defined as 1 2 ( ) ... , 1, 2,...,
The probabilistic meaning of F(x) is the following: F(x) is the probability that the network is DOWN if exactly x of its randomly chosen components are down. In practice, the exact computation of F(x) is an NP-complex problem, and usually it is approximately calculated using Monte Carlo, see [3, 4] . Now suppose that we know the D-spectra 
(The second sum in (5) is the probability that there will be more than A m failures in [0, ] t which leads to network failure with probability 1).
After A has failed, as a result of the second phase, some random number of nodes Y in B will be damaged. We know the distribution of Y , see (2):
Given that k nodes in B are damaged, B is DOWN with probability ( ).
B
F k This gives the following probability that B is DOWN if A is DOWN:
Finally, we are ready to write the expression for the probability ( ; ):
Example
Network A has 25 nodes, 34 edges and | | 4
A T r   terminals, see Figure 1a . 5,
respectively. These nodes are chosen in a random and independent way, and the maximal number of nodes which can be destroyed equals 1 2 3 4 15.
Network B is shown on Figure 1b . It has 20 nodes and 34 edges; nodes 1,2,3 are terminals. These nodes are the "hubs" of the network, and isolation of any of them from two others is considered as B DOWN state. This network has been studied in [5] . Below is the node cumulative D-spectrum of B, see [5] : After A fails, the number of damaged nodes Y in B lies in the interval [1, 15] , and the probability that Y = k nodes are damaged equals by (2) ( 1) 17
98% of all probability of Y is concentrated in the interval 8 13 Somewhat surprising is the fact that R = 15 "attacks" on 17 non terminal nodes of B result in a relatively low failure probability. This happens because many nodes receive more than one "ball" and some nodes, therefore, remain undamaged.
Let us investigate the dependence of ( ;5 0 ) B P DOWN on R for R > 15. The corresponding data are presented in Table 2 . To guarantee that B fails with probability at least 0.90, 27 or more "attacks" need to be carried out from A on nodes of B. When, on the contrary, R = 12, the failure probability drops to 0.214. We conclude that B in our example is quite reliable and its reliability is rather sensitive to the total number of random "attacks" on the non terminal nodes of B.
It is expected that the "attacks" of A terminals will be more efficient if R is divided into several portions and each portion will be "attacking" a subset i S of nodes, chosen in such a way that these subsets are not intersecting and \ . 
Concluding Remarks
Our further research will be aimed at the extension of the above described model to the situation of interconnected networks, i.e. to the study of failure development in the presence of mutual dependence of networks A and B states. In the case of interconnection, it is interesting to investigate how the failures of both networks evolve in time and how are distributed the time instants of their failure.
